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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the impact of temporary agency work on firm performance 
using panel data from German establishments. Thereby, special attention is devoted to the 
question, whether there are performance differences between firms using temporary agency 
workers (TAWs) as a buffer stock (flexibility strategy) and firms using TAWs for screening 
purposes (screening strategy). While the theoretical discussion on this issue does not lead to 
clear-cut results, our empirical investigation provides the following results. First, we find an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between the share of TAWs and firm performance. Second, we 
obtain that firms following the screening strategy are significantly more productive than firms 
following the flexibility strategy. These results are found to be valid in both cross-sectional 
and panel data settings, so they are robust to unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the growth in the temporary agency industry has been tremendous – 
irrespective of the level of employment protection legislation (EPL). For example, both 
Germany and Switzerland – the former known as a country with a rather high level of EPL, 
the latter rather known as a low EPL-level country – have witnessed a growth of 10 % p. a. in 
the number of temporary agency workers (TAWs) over the past 10 years. In 2007 more than 
700’000 TAWs were employed in German firms, corresponding to about 1 % of the total 
labor force (Gerwien 2008). In trying to explain this development, literature points to changes 
in external forces boosting the demand for TAWs. These chances contain a growing 
competition and the need for flexibility and cutting costs (Kirk and Belovics 2008), a distinct 
EPL, which can be avoided by employing TAWs (Hagen and Boockmann 2002), and 
deregulation tendencies in the temporary agency sector relaxing the requirements to employ 
TAWs (MacPhail and Bowles 2008). 
 
We refer to temporary work as the triangular relationship between a TAW, a temporary work 
agency and a client firm, whose performance is being examined in this paper. The agency is 
the de jure employer of the worker. Therefore, the agency pays the wage (Mitlacher 2005) and 
keeps disciplinary authority over the TAW (Bianchi/Lampart 2007). The agency lends the 
TAW to a client firm, which in turn pays a fee to the agency. Therefore, the client firm has 
got managerial authority over the TAW. According to Föhr (2000), temporary work agencies 
help to reduce transaction costs (e.g. search costs and bargaining costs) between client firms 
and workers.1 This is especially true in the case of specific human capital, i.e. in case of 
employees with further vocational training. Additionally, temporary work agencies can 
specialize in HR tasks such as developing better screening tests or attracting a larger pool of 
candidates.  
 
There are two main reasons why client firms hire TAWs (Forde, MacKenzie and Robinson 
2008): flexibility and screening. For example, firms can use TAWs to meet short-term 
fluctuations in demand, i.e. to enhance their flexibility (Boockmann and Hagen 2001). In this 
case, TAWs serve as a buffer allowing short-term employment adjustments without affecting 
                                                 
1 For example, client firms do not need to place an advertisement in a newspaper or on the internet. Furthermore, 
they do not necessarily need to interview and sometimes even select applicants. These (pre-)selection activities 
are typically delegated to the temporary work agencies.  
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permanent employees (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002b). On the other hand, firms can 
also use TAWs to screen workers before hiring them on a permanent basis (Pfeifer 2006). In 
that case, firms signal a long-term interest to TAWs, because temporary work may constitute 
a stepping stone for them into permanent employment (Barbieri and Sestito 2008, Booth, 
Francesconi and Frank 2002a).  
 
These diverging strategies could have different effects on firm performance. For example, by 
following a flexibility strategy a firm could at first maintain a continuing production in spite 
of a potential short-term labor shortage (Bryson 2007). Moreover, the firm is also able to 
respond to fluctuations in demand flexibly and at low cost (Kirk and Belovics 2008). As a 
result, these benefits of flexibility may increase firm performance. On the other hand, firms 
using TAWs as a buffer stock internally implement a dual labor market consisting of 
permanent core workers and flexible temporary workers, whose employment opportunities are 
subject to demand fluctuations (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002b). This could deteriorate 
the motivation of TAWs and thus affect a firm’s productivity.  
 
On the contrary, the application of the screening strategy may be associated with positive 
motivation and productivity effects, because the TAWs have the option to be promoted to a 
permanent job, when the screening process ends up in a positive evaluation (Engellandt und 
Riphahn 2005). On the other hand, however, negative spill-over effects may be opposed to the 
intention of the screening strategy. These effects may occur, when permanent employees feel 
threatened to be replaced by hard working TAWs. In this case, permanent workers are likely 
to cut down on their willingness to cooperate with TAWs (Martins and Lima 2006; 
Chattopadhyay and George 2001). Hence, the screening strategy may also involve adverse 
firm performance effects.   
 
The objective of our paper is twofold: First, we aim at empirically examining the impact of 
temporary work on firm performance in Germany. Specifically, we are interested in 
examining the productivity effects as well as the motivation effects of TAW use. Previous 
studies have focussed on the productivity effects of temporary work in other countries and 
have come to mixed or insignificant results (Bryson 2007; Arvanitis 2005; Kleinknecht et al. 
2006). Second, we want to address the issue of whether there are performance differences 
between firms using temporary work as a buffer stock and firms that use it for screening 
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purposes. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been tackled by other studies 
before.  
 
For this purpose, we use data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) establishment 
panel (waves 2000-2005). At first, we run OLS, fixed and random effects regressions in order 
to estimate the productivity and motivation effects of TAW use. Thereby, we are able to 
correct for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Additionally, we apply a two-step-procedure 
proposed by Black and Lynch (2001) in order to discriminate between the productivity effects 
of the flexibility and the screening strategy. Our respective empirical model is an augmented 
Cobb-Douglas production function. The estimation results allow the derivation of 
management implications for the effective use of temporary agency workers. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background of this study. In Section 3 we shortly discuss the related empirical literature. 
Section 4 contains our empirical investigation. At first, we introduce the dataset and our main 
variables and present some descriptive results. Subsequently, we explain the econometric 
modelling and the results regarding the productivity effects of TAW use. We proceed 
analogously with respect to the productivity effects of TAW use in firms following the 
flexibility or the screening strategy, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
2. Theoretical Background 
The employment of TAWs may be economically interesting for client firms for at least two 
reasons (Forde, MacKenzie and Robinson 2008). First, TAWs enable firms to meet their 
flexibility requirements more effectively than the alternative employment of permanent 
workers. Second, the use of TAWs provides firms with an additional screening device to 
reduce the typical pre-contractual principal-agent information problem with respect to the 
abilities and motivation of the workers to be recruited. In this sense, the employment of 
TAWs serves as a prolonged probation period, in which the firm has the opportunity to obtain 
the necessary information. We refer to the first motive for employing TAWs as flexibility 
strategy, while we call the second motive just mentioned screening strategy.  
 
The use of TAWs may increase the flexibility of client firms, because TAWs allow these 
firms to rapidly respond to demand fluctuations and staff shortages (Hagen and Boockmann 
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2002; Kirk and Belovics 2008). For example, in times of labor shortage temporary work 
agencies are able to provide the firms concerned with TAWs in the short run. In this way, the 
flexible use of TAWs allows firms to maintain an uninterrupted production. This is important 
not only because production technology can be applied continuously and at high capacity, but 
also because customers can be served in due time (Bryson 2007). Additionally, in times of 
increasing demand firms may prefer to extend their workforce employing TAWs instead of 
permanent employees, because the separation from TAWs is usually much easier than the 
dismissal of permanent employees, when demand declines. Hence, employing TAWs offer 
firms an opportunity to flexibly adjust their workforce in response to demand requirements. 
The flexibility argument is even amplified in countries with a high level of EPL, since 
employing TAWs instead of permanent workers allows firms to save dismissal costs. 
Specifically, TAWs can easily be dismissed without dismissal costs sending the TAWs back 
to the temporary work agency, while the dismissal of permanent employees typically requires 
the adherence of cancellation periods and substantial severance payments. Finally, firms 
employing TAWs are able to realize cost benefits relative to employing permanent workers. A 
direct cost advantage results from the fact that TAWs typically receive significant lower 
wages than permanent workers, while an indirect benefit cost effect can be achieved by 
putting pressure on the wages of all employees (Bryson 2007). Summing up, these benefits of 
flexibility are likely to have a positive effect on firm performance.  
 
On the other hand, firms following the flexibility motive internally implement a dual labor 
market consisting of privileged permanent employees in a secure position and precarious 
TAWs sitting in a trap (Pfeifer 2006). Moreover, TAWs usually experience lower wages, 
poorer working conditions and less training than permanent employees (Nienhüser and 
Matiaske 2006).2 When TAWs recognize that permanent workers are much better off with 
respect to several important job characteristics than TAWs, although both types of workers 
execute similar tasks, this relative job discrimination could reduce TAWs’ effort, motivation 
and productivity and may even deteriorate the cooperation with permanent employees. 
Following this line of reasoning, the flexibility strategy is likely to have a negative effect on 
firm performance.  
 
Alternatively, by following a screening strategy a firm may increase the motivation, effort 
level and productivity of TAWs. The reason for this is that – contrary to the flexibility 
                                                 
2 Additionally, Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) finds that TAWs exhibit significantly higher work injury and illness 
rates. 
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strategy – the screening strategy implies the possibility of a long-term perspective for the 
TAWs. While temporary work in firms following the flexibility motive can be thought of 
being a ‘dead end’ for the TAWs concerned, it may serve as a ‘stepping stone’ for TAWs 
working in firms following the screening motive.3 In these firms, namely, TAWs are initially 
employed under the usual conditions of temporary agency work, but are offered a permanent 
job, after having proven their worth. This option may enhance to TAWs motivation and effort 
level.  
 
The rationale for applying the screening strategy can be explained using classical results of 
the principal agent and tournament theory. It is well-known from the principal agent literature 
that employers usually face a pre-contractual information problem with respect to unobserved 
individual worker characteristics, such as ability and motivation. The employment of TAWs 
may represent a possible solution to this information problem. An employer may prefer to 
initially employ a TAW instead of a permanent worker, because this allows him to gain the 
required information. In that way, temporary agency work can be thought of representing a 
prolonged probation period enabling the employer to improve his recruitment decisions, 
which corresponds to reducing the cost of wrong employment decisions, i.e. the costs of 
hiring unable workers. If a TAW is positively evaluated after the screening process, he will be 
promoted to a permanent position, while he has to leave the firm in the converse case of a 
negative evaluation. Proceeding that way the employer in the end initializes a job tournament 
between the TAWs, where the winner prize is a permanent job and losers have to leave the 
firm.  
 
It is well-known from the tournament literature that tournaments do not only exhibit a 
selection function but also an incentive function (e.g. Lazear and Gibbs 2008; Garibaldi 
2006). In general, tournaments are intended to encourage workers to spend high effort, when 
the winner prize is high relative to the loser prize. In the present case, there is a winner-takes-
all-situation, because the positively evaluated TAWs are offered a permanent job, while the 
negatively evaluated TAWs have to leave the firm. Hence, the wage differential between 
positively and negatively evaluated TAWs is likely to be sufficiently large to generate high 
effort levels among the competing TAWs. As a consequence, the screening strategy is 
supposed to have a positive effect on firm performance.   
 
                                                 
3 The terms ‘dead end’ and ‘stepping stone’ can be ascribed to Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002a).  
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On the other hand, applying the screening strategy may also be associated with substantial 
drawbacks calling the reasoning just mentioned into question. For example, permanent 
workers may perceive the job tournament among the TAWs as a threat for their own jobs, 
which virtually should be quite secure by definition (Martins and Lima 2006; Bryson 2007). 
More precisely, permanent workers may worry about their own jobs, because they cannot 
definitely rule out the possibility to be replaced by successful TAWs, even if this is not the 
primary intention of the up or out-tournament. In this case, peer relations are likely to 
deteriorate because permanent workers might refuse to cooperate with TAWs (Chattopadhyay 
and George 2001). Hence, work organization could substantially be affected. Furthermore, 
worker-manager relations and the loyalty between those two parties could also worsen, 
encouraging permanent employees to quit, and thus, increasing the turnover rate of the firm 
(Davis-Blake, Broschak and George 2003). As a consequence, these negative spill-over 
effects on permanent employees may involve a negative effect on firm performance.  
 
All in all, the theoretical discussion with respect to the effect of TAWs on firm performance is 
heterogeneous. Both the flexibility strategy and the screening strategy may be associated with 
positive or negative performance effects, while the relative effect of the two strategies 
remains an open question. Our empirical analysis, therefore, aims at sheding light on this 
issue. More precisely, we first estimate the general effect of temporary agency work on firm 
performance. Our second objective is to estimate whether there are productivity differences 
between firms following the flexibility strategy and those following the screening strategy. 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, however, we provide a brief review of the related 
empirical literature.  
3. Related Literature  
Several authors address the benefits of the screening strategy, however, without comparing it 
to the flexibility strategy. For example, Erickcek, Houseman and Kalleberg (2002) conduct 
case studies of 18 Midwestern firms in manufacturing, health care and education. They find 
that temporary agency work has less negative or even positive effects for TAWs, if the client 
firm follows a screening strategy, which offers a long-term perspective to the TAWs. 
Moreover, Tan and Tan (2002) empirically examine the determinants of job satisfaction 
among 141 TAWs of four Singaporean temporary work agencies. They find that involuntary 
TAWs – i.e. those TAWs that virtually prefer and thus primarily seek a permanent job, but 
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have accepted a contract with a temporary work agency for the present – work extra hard in 
order to signal their capabilities. On the basis of 174 TAWs of a Midwestern agency, 
Ellingson, Gruys and Sackett (1998) find that involuntary TAWs indeed exhibit a lower level 
of satisfaction than voluntary TAWs; their productivity, however, is not significantly affected. 
Neither Tan and Tan (2002) nor Ellingson, Gruys and Sackett (1998) mention the screening 
strategy explicitly, but there seems to be an evident relationship. Consequently, tournaments 
among TAWs can serve as a meaningful and efficient method for screening new employees.  
 
Turning to cross sectional studies on productivity effects of TAWs at the establishment level, 
the results are mixed. For example, Arvanitis (2005) uses a nationally representative sample 
of 1,382 Swiss firms covering all sectors and firm sizes in order to investigate the impact of 
functional and numerical flexibility on firm performance and innovation activity. In his OLS-
regression, he finds a positive, but insignificant effect of temporary agency work on sales per 
capita, where temporary agency work is a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
temporary agency work is an important HR practice in that firm.  
 
Kleinknecht et al. (2006) use a dataset, which has been collected by the “Organisation for 
Strategic Labour Market Research” (OSA) of the Netherlands and includes 590 firms from a 
wide range of sectors (e.g. manufacturing, agriculture, services, and non-commercial 
services). Apparently applying OLS, they find a positive, but insignificant effect of the 
percentage of hours hired from temporary work agencies on sales growth. However, they find 
a significantly positive effect on sales growth in firms with some R&D activities.  
 
Bryson (2007) uses the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, which is a nationally 
representative sample of 2,295 British establishments with five or more employees from a 
wide range of sectors. In a first step, the author finds that TAW presence in a workplace is 
associated with significant 30 % higher sales per employee. In a second step, measuring the 
extent of TAW use, none of the two dummy variables – one covering workplaces with 1-4 % 
TAWs, the other covering workplaces with more than 5 % TAWs – is significantly different 
from zero in explaining sales per capita or value added per capita. However, an alternative 
subjective measure of labor productivity, which is intended to capture labor productivity 
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relative to other establishments belonging to the same industry, is significantly affected in 
firms employing 1-4 % TAWs.4
 
Given these mixed and less clear-cut results, the empirical evidence so far is not able to shed 
light on the productivity effects of temporary agency work. In addition, it must be mentioned 
that the previously discussed studies suffer from an important drawback. Neither of the 
studies, namely, accounts for unobserved firm heterogeneity. As a consequence, the estimated 
productivity effects of temporary agency work cannot be interpreted as causal effects, but 
represent simple correlations. A prominent example for unobserved firm heterogeneity is 
management quality. Provided that high sale firms employ more experienced or better 
qualified managers and that those managers simultaneously tend to employ more (or less) 
TAWs than their less qualified counterparts, temporary agency work cannot be assumed an 
exogenous explanatory variable. As a result, OLS estimates are likely to be biased and 
inconsistent. Therefore, an important objective of our empirical investigation is to control for 
unobserved firm characteristics using panel data and applying appropriate estimation 
methods. Furthermore, contrary to previous studies we aim at discriminating between the 
productivity effects of firms following the flexibility strategy relative to firms following the 
screening strategy. In this sense, our paper should add substantially to the empirical literature 
on the effects of temporary agency work on firm performance. 
4. Empirical Investigation 
4.1 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In our study, we use the data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) Establishment 
Panel. The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of over 15,000 establishments in 
Germany. The establishments are selected from a parent sample of all German establishments 
that employ at least one employee covered by social security. This parent sample can be 
considered as complete, because establishments have to report on their employees under 
social security by law. The selection method is stratification with respect to ten categories of 
establishment size and 16 economic sectors. This is why an establishment’s probability of 
                                                 
4 Martins and Lima (2006) find a negative relationship between the share of top managers recruited from outside 
and labor productivity. Although this result does not deal with TAWs, the principle behind is similar in a way 
that the issue in both cases is recruiting from outside instead of promotion from within.  
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being selected increases with employment. Hence, the IAB establishment panel is 
approximately proportional to employment and therefore representative for the German 
economy. A large set of questions are covered periodically, such as employment and wages, 
sales, investments, export, R&D, innovations, organizational change, and vocational training 
(Bellmann, Kohaut and Lahner 2002). Additionally, special topics are covered by the 
questionnaire every year. For example temporary agency work is covered quite extensively in 
2003.  
 
The dependent variables are log sales measured in euro (lnY) and a variable indicating the 
extent of motivation problems in the establishment (mot). The latter is being constructed by 
summing up four dummy variables reflecting the interviewed firm representative’s 
expectation about the existence of “a lack of labor motivation”, “a high level of fluctuation”, 
“a high level of absenteeism” and some “migration of high-skilled workers”. Thus, the 
variable mot can theoretically take values from zero to four.5
 
The key explanatory variable for the first research question – performance effects of 
temporary agency work – is the share of TAWs relative to total employment (temp).6 Apart 
form the original variable the estimation model does also contain the quadratic term (temp_2) 
to capture non-linearities. In order to provide an alternative specification, establishments were 
sorted into categories, depending on whether TAWs make up zero percent (temp1), 1-10 % 
(temp2), 11-30 % (temp3) or more than 30 % (temp4) of total employment. These dummy 
variables temp1-temp4 indicate the affiliation of an establishment to one of these categories.  
 
The key explanatory variables for the second research question – flexibility vs. screening 
strategy – are dummy variables indicating whether an establishment uses temporary agency 
work as a flexibility device (flex) or as a screening device (screen) or whether an 
                                                 
5 One could also construct two alternative motivation problem variables. First, one could just use the dummy 
variable “lack of labor motivation” as dependent variable because it directly tackles the core problem considered 
here, namely motivation problems at work. However, this variable would neglect indirect consequences of a lack 
of motivation, which can be evident through high levels of absenteeism and fluctuation, especially in the case of 
high-skilled workers, whose outside options are often better than those of less skilled workers. Second, one could 
construct a dummy variable which takes the value one if one of the four indicators mentioned above, i.e. “lack of 
labor motivation”, “high level of fluctuation”, “high level of absenteeism” and “migration of high-skilled 
workers”, is valid and zero otherwise. However, this alternative would not capture the quantitative extent of 
motivational problems. Irrespective of this objection, we also ran regressions using these two alternative 
variables. The estimates do not differ in sign and significance from those presented later in this paper. 
6 Total employment means regular employees plus TAWs minus fractionally employed persons (these are 
employees who are on the payroll of the establishment but earn less than 400 euro per month). 
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establishment follows a dual strategy (fl_sc).7 Proceeding that way, only those establishments 
using TAWs at all are considered in the analysis. Firms have been regarded as flexibility 
establishments, if they usually adjust their workforce using TAWs to meet unexpected 
fluctuations in demand or production. On the other hand, firms have been regarded as 
screening establishments, if they have recently promoted workers that had previously been 
employed as TAWs to a permanent position. These questions allow for a direct classification 
without relying on indirect indicator variables.8  
 
Finally, we use the following control variables: the natural logarithm of total investments 
(lnK) as an indicator for the establishments’ capital stock, the natural logarithm of total 
employment (lnL), the share of high-skilled workers relative to regular employment (qual), 
outsourcing or insourcing activities of an establishment measured on a 0 to 4 scale and 
standardized (orga1_std), the state of the technical equipment measured on a 1 to 5 scale and 
standardized (tech_std), a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm has invested in 
information and communication technologies (ikt), a dummy variable indicating the existence 
of a collective wage agreement on establishment or industry level (wageset), a dummy 
variable indicating the existence of a work council (council), two dummy variables indicating 
whether an establishment belongs to a non-incorporated (noninc) or incorporated firm (inc)9, 
a dummy variable indicating whether an establishment has been founded before 1990 (old), a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not an establishment is held by foreign owners 
(foreign), the share of exports relative to total sales (export), as well as controls for the 16 
German federal states (reg1-reg16) and for nine industry and service sectors (sector1-
sector9).  
 
Control variables only being available for 2004 are: a dummy variable indicating whether an 
establishment has offered continuous training to its employees either by paying the costs or by 
special company leave (training), a 0 to 10 scaled variable (standardized) indicating the extent 
                                                 
7 The reference category consists of establishments without affiliation to either of these strategies. 
8 Alternatively, establishments could be identified as flexibility establishments, if using TAWs is their most 
important measure to meet short-term fluctuations. A second possibility, proposed by Binz (2007), would be to 
use a high share of TAWs to identify flexibility establishments and a high share of former TAWs that have now 
been promoted to a permanent position to identify screening establishments. Both alternatives have been 
additionally applied. The estimates do not differ in sign and significance from those presented later in this paper. 
9 Reference categories for noninc and inc are special organizations, such as public bureaus, membership 
associations or cooperative societies.  
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of organizational changes undertaken by an establishment (orga2_std)10, a dummy variable 
indicating whether an establishment offers pay for performance applying stock ownership 
plans or profit sharing (incentive), a variable of product innovation (measured on a 0 to 3 
scale and standardized) indicating whether products have been improved, newly integrated 
into the range of existing products or completely new developed (inno_std).11 Table 1 
provides an overview of the most important descriptive statistics of the key variables.12  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2 Productivity and Motivation Effects of Temporary Agency Work 
 
4.2.1 Econometric Model  
 
In order to examine the productivity effects of temporary agency work, we estimate a Cobb-
Douglas production function which is augmented by the share of temporary agency workers 
relative to total employment (temp), the quadratic term (temp_2) and the control variables X 
introduced above. An alternative specification includes dummy variables instead of temp and 
temp_2. These dummy variables indicate whether an establishment employs 1-10 % TAWs 
(temp2), 11-30 % TAWs (temp3) or more than 30 % TAWs (temp4). The reference group 
represent those firms without TAWs.13 Both specifications are formally displayed in 
equations (1a) and 1b):  
 
∑ = ++++++= nj itjitjititititit uXtemptempLKY 121210 2_lnlnln δγγβββ  , (1a) 
                                                 
10 These organizational changes include the reorganization of the supply chain, the improvement of quality 
management, improvements of ecological standards, an increase of the grade of decentralization, the 
introduction of team work, the introduction of profit centers, and the reorganization of departments. 
11 See Binz (2007) concerning selection, description and justification of the control variable used. 
12 Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix provide the definitions and descriptive statistics of the complete set of variables 
used in this study. 
13 This procedure is common in the literature we refer to (e.g. Kleinknecht et al. 2006; Bryson 2007). Arvanitis 
(2005) uses a five-point Likert scale variable indicating whether or not temporary work is important. The exact 
limits of 10 % and 30 %, respectively, are not arbitrarily chosen. As the results (see Table 2) will show, the level 
of 10 % approximately corresponds to the optimum of the production function (1a) estimated with fixed effects, 
while the level of 30 % approximates the second null of the parabola. As a complement to these specifications, 
we also ran a model splitting the input factor labor into two parts, namely regular and temporary agency workers. 
Splitting input factors in the context of a Cobb-Douglas production function (capital, labor) has been used in 
many fields (see e.g. Acemoglu 2002). The results – not reported in this paper – show that the elasticity of 
regular workers is significantly and by far larger than that of TAWs. Perhaps, further examinations of such 
relationships lead to more detailed explanations in terms of the course of the production function discovered in 
Table 2. 
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it
n
j jitjk itkkititit
uXtempLKY ∑∑ == +++++= 14 2210 lnlnln δγβββ  ,  (1b) 
 
where Y is total sales, K represents capital stock, L describes labor, and u is a i. i. d. random 
variable (i is the establishment index, t is the time index). At first, we employ pooled OLS 
using the waves 2002-2005 and applying heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors according 
to White (1980). 
 
Since we argue that a high share of TAWs could constitute motivation problems within the 
workforce, we explain motivation problems (mot) using the same augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production function, where lnY is replaced by mot: 
 
∑ = ++++++= nj itjitjititititit uXtemptempLKmot 121210 2_lnln δγγβββ  , (2a) 
it
n
j jitjk itkkititit
uXtempLKmot ∑∑ == +++++= 14 2210 lnln δγβββ  .  (2b) 
 
The variable mot is censored at zero. It takes the value zero in 76 % of all cases. Hence, 
applying a tobit maximum likelihood estimator is the appropriate estimation procedure.14 
Limited data availability restricts us to use the waves 2002, 2004 and 2005. 
 
Cross sectional and pooled OLS estimations can be biased, if some time-invariant unobserved 
factors vi influence the dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables 
simultaneously. In this case, the concerned explanatory variables can no longer considered 
exogenous, so OLS looses its BLUE-characteristics. As discussed above, a prominent 
example for unobserved firm heterogeneity is management quality. In order to control for 
such unobserved firm characteristics we use panel estimation methods, i.e., we estimate fixed 
effects and random effects models. Proceeding that way, we can exploit the (unbalanced) 
panel structure of our data. The equations to be estimated are: 
 
∑ = +++++++= nj itijitjititititit uvXtemptempLKY 121210 2_lnlnln δγγβββ , (3a) 
it
n
j ijitjk itkkititit uvXtempLKY ∑∑ == ++++++= 14 2210 lnlnln δγβββ   (3b) 
and 
                                                 
14 We also applied ordered probit and ordered logit models yielding qualitatively similar results.  
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∑ = +++++++= nj itijitjititititit uvXtemptempLKmot 121210 2_lnln δγγβββ , (4a) 
it
n
j ijitjk itkkititit
uvXtempLKmot ∑∑ == ++++++= 14 2210 lnln δγβββ .  (4b) 
 
4.2.2 Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 contains the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimates of the 
productivity effects of temporary agency work for each of the two specifications. More 
precisely, columns 1-3 display the results for the TAW share specification, while columns 4-6 
display the results for the dummy variable specification. For both specifications the Breusch-
Pagan-test cannot reject a significant explanation power of the establishment-specific effects. 
The also applied Hausman-tests support the fixed effects models (columns 2 and 5) compared 
to the random effects models (columns 3 and 6).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The parameter estimates of the preferred fixed effects model indicate an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between the share of TAWs and establishment productivity. The significant 
coefficients of temp and temp_2 in column 2 allow calculating a theoretical optimum, which 
corresponds to a TAW share of 13.63 %.15 At this point, the performance effect of temporary 
agency work is strongest.  
 
According to the results displayed in column 5, establishments with more than 30 % TAWs 
exhibit ceteris paribus a 19.4 % lower productivity than establishments without TAWs. This 
result is statistically significant at the 1 %-level. Establishments with less than 10 % TAWs 
exhibit a 0.2 % higher productivity than firms without TAWs. However, the estimated 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, which can be explained as follows. The 
regression coefficient represents the marginal effects of a variable x on a variable y, if all 
other regressors take on their mean value and are held constant (ceteris paribus condition). 
Although a low share of TAWs per se would increase productivity, it is possible that 
establishments with a low share of TAWs in our sample are not more productive than those 
with a high share of TAWs, because regressors with a negative coefficient exhibit a high 
                                                 
15 This figure, however, can just be considered as an approximation because of the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients. 
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value for those establishments covered by the dummy temp2. Such regressors could mitigate 
the per se positive effect of temporary agency work. The consequence would then be an 
insignificant coefficient for the establishment dummy temp2. Apart from this point, both the 
pooled OLS and the random effects panel estimates (columns 4 and 6) show a positive 
performance effect of such establishments with a less than 10 % TAW share. 
  
In the literature review we argue that a too large share of TAWs could have adverse effects on 
the motivation of both TAWs and regular employees. Therefore, in another specification we 
attempt to explain motivational problems with the extent of TAWs usage in client firms. The 
results are displayed in Table 3. Since these estimates result from the tobit maximum 
likelihood estimation method, we are not able to obtain unbiased fixed effects estimates 
(Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997, footnote 15).  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
There are no qualitative differences between the pooled OLS and the random effects panel 
estimates. The expected motivational problems (mot) increase significantly with the share of 
TAWs. This effect does not diminish, when the TAW share rises. This result is in line with 
our reasoning with respect to an inverse U-shaped relationship between TAWs and firm 
performance. According to Table 3, a low share of TAWs provides both regular and 
temporary employees enough incentives to increase their effort and thus firm performance. 
Apart from that, Ellingson, Gruys and Sackett (1998) show that initial motivation problems do 
not necessarily need to be associated with lower firm performance. However, as the share of 
TAWs rises, the incentive effect appears to become weaker. On the other hand, the negative 
motivation effect remains constant. All in all, this leads to a negative performance of those 
establishments experiencing a high share of TAWs.  
 
4.3 Flexibility vs. Screening Strategy 
 
4.3.1 Econometric Model  
 
In order to detect potential productivity differences between establishments following the 
flexibility strategy or the screening strategy, respectively, we augment the Cobb-Douglas 
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production function by dummy variables indicating whether an establishment uses temporary 
agency work as a flexibility device (flex) or as a screening device (screen) or whether it 
follows a dual strategy (fl_sc). The estimation equation is: 
  
i
n
j jijiiiiii
uXscflscreenflexLKY ∑ = +++++++= 1321210 _lnlnln δγγγβββ . (5) 
 
Since these indicator variables are only available in one year (2004), we can neither apply the 
pure fixed effects nor the pure random effects model on the whole set of explanatory variables 
to address the issue of unobserved firm heterogeneity. An appropriate solution in this case has 
been proposed by Black and Lynch (2001). Their two-step-procedure allows us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in a situation, where the core explanatory variables are only 
available in one panel wave. The first step consists of a within-estimation of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, which is augmented by year, industry and regional dummies 
(summarized by the vector Z) to control for cyclical, sector-specific, and regional 
developments. Of course, the variables used in this first step estimation need to be available in 
more than just one year (here: 2000-2005): 
 
iti
m
j jitjititit
uvZLKY +++++= ∑ =1210 lnlnln ηβββ .    (6) 
 
From the estimation of equation (6), the establishment fixed effect can be retrieved (Verbeek 
2004): 
 
∑ =−−−= mj ijjiFEiFEii ZLKYv 121 ˆlnˆlnˆlnˆ ηββ ,     (7) 
 
where the bars over the variables represent the corresponding mean values. 
 
In the second step, this fixed effect is regressed on the strategy indicator variables (flex, 
screen, and fl_sc) and a set of control variables X: 
 
i
n
j jijiiii
Xscflscreenflexv ∑ = +++++= 13210 _ˆ ζδγγγγ ,    (8) 
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where ζi is an i. i. d. random variable. The estimated coefficients 321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ γγγ  are of special 
interest, because they represent the particular effect of the indicator variables – i.e. (flex, 
screen, and fl_sc) – on the fixed effect of an establishment’s productivity.  
 
4.3.2 Empirical Results 
 
In analogy to the proceeding in Zwick (2006), Table 4 displays the estimates of the second 
stage of the Black-Lynch estimation procedure.16 As a reference, Table 4 does also contain 
the usual cross sectional estimations applying the OLS method.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Regarding the OLS estimates, flexibility establishments exhibit a significantly lower level of 
performance than the firms in the reference category (establishments, which do not follow any 
specific strategy concerning temporary agency work). On the other hand, the Black-Lynch 
estimates of the second stage uncover a higher performance level of screening establishments. 
The key point, however, is the question, whether or not the difference between the 
coefficients of the two strategy dummies is significant in each of the estimation equations. 
This can easily be tested for by a simple F-test. In both cases, the coefficients are significantly 
different with p < 0.0025. Hence, based on our estimates we can conclude that firms 
following the screening strategy are very likely to perform much better than firms following 
the flexibility strategy. 
5. Conclusion 
From our findings several conclusions can be drawn: First, the observation that more and 
more firms have begun to use temporary agency work can be explained by a positive 
productivity effect of temporary agency work, provided the share of temporary agency 
workers (TAWs) is relatively low. Second, the inverse U-shaped relationship between 
temporary agency work and firm performance can be explained as follows: If the share of 
TAWs in a firm is relatively low, the motivating effect on TAWs appears to dominate the 
threatening effect on permanent employees, so the net performance effect is positive. If, 
                                                 
16 The results of the first step are available from the authors upon request. 
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however, the share of TAWs increases, the threatening effect begins to dominate the 
motivating effect, leading to a negative net performance effect. Third, firms using TAWs as a 
measure of screening are significantly more productive than firms using TAWs as a measure 
of flexibility. This could be explained by the fact that screening establishments offer the 
possibility of a long-term perspective to their TAWs, without threatening the secure positions 
of their permanent employees. Hence, we conclude that temporary agency work, handled 
appropriately, can indeed be considered as an effective and productivity enhancing screening 
device.  
 
In our opinion, the present contribution adds to the existing literature in the following way. 
First, in contrast to former empirical studies, we are able to analyze panel data and can thus 
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Our results are robust to different specifications 
and estimation methods. Second, we are able to discriminate between different motives that 
firms may be following with the employment of TAWs. Specifically, we can discriminate 
between firms following the flexibility strategy and firms following the screening strategy. 
Thereby, we find that screening firms are better off than flexibility firms, which has also not 
been investigated yet.  
 
The results of our study imply important recommendations for firms using the services of 
temporary work agencies by employing TAWs. First, the magnitude of employing TAWs 
should not exceed an amount of about 10 to 15 % relative to total employment. Second, our 
empirical results suggest following the screening strategy rather than the flexibility strategy. 
Although the screening strategy is not unlikely to involve a threatening scenario for 
permanent workers, the incentive effect for TAWs participating at the up or out-tournament 
obviously dominates the threatening effect. Analogously, the benefits of the flexibility 
strategy, e.g., rapid adjustments to demand fluctuation and cost reductions, appear to be 
outperformed by the drawbacks, which are associated with this strategy, namely the 
motivational problems caused by the formation of a dual labor market within a firm. In either 
case, we would advise firms employing TAWs to follow a screening strategy rather than a 
flexibility strategy. Contrary to the latter, the screening strategy announces the TAWs 
concerned the possibility of a long-term perspective within the firm and thus avoids the 
negative consequences of internally formed dual labor markets.  
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In the management literature some practical implementation proposals with respect to a 
responsible dealing with TAWs have already been made:17 First, applying the concept of 
procedural justice, the TAWs commitment towards the firm is likely to increase, if they feel to 
be treated fairly relative to permanent employees (Camerman 2007). Second, the TAWs’ 
general well-being and job satisfaction can be increased by expanding an existing 
empowerment concept from the level of permanent workers to the level of TAWs (Twiname, 
Humphries and Kearins 2006). For example, TAWs are likely to feel more assimilated, if the 
client firm incorporates them into its procedures, norms and values right at the beginning of 
the assignment (Slattery, Selvarajan and Anderson 2006). Moreover, if more decentralization 
and participation do not only apply for permanent workers but also for TAWs, job satisfaction 
of both types of employees is likely to be positively influenced, which in turn could be 
associated with a rise in firm performance. Analogously, if firms adopt a human resource 
management system that does not only focus on permanent employees but pays also sufficient 
attention to TAWs, firm performance is likely to increase. Potential components of such a 
HRM system may concern worker selection, training, performance evaluations, and fringe 
benefits (Koene and van Riemsdijk 2005; Mitlacher 2005). Of course, the productivity effects 
intended with such HRM systems are more likely to achieve, when the firm additionally 
follows a screening strategy than a flexibility strategy. Hence, the HRM measures described 
above and the screening strategy should be considered as complements.  
 
These implementation proposals have the potential to prevent TAWs from being stigmatized 
(Boyce, Ryan and Imus 2007). Additionally, the implementation of such a coherent HRM 
system including the screening strategy is likely to constitute a win-win-situation for both 
parties. On the one hand, the client firms can benefit, because such a system is likely to 
increase their performance. On the other hand, also the TAWs can benefit, because they get 
the chance to improve their everyday life and their long-term job perspectives.  
                                                 
17 A comprehensive analysis, comparison, and discussion of these proposals would certainly go beyond the scope 
of such a concluding section. 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
      
Variable   Obs     Mean Std. Dev. Min      Max
mot 74107 0.3145992 0.6325092 0 4
lnY 78910 14.7836 2.407127 0 27.52457
temp 63284 0.7351526 3.795116 0 92.30769
temp1 63397 0.8897424 0.313213 0 1
temp2 63397 0.0888686 0.2845562 0 1
temp3 63397 0.0177611 0.132083 0 1
temp4 63397 0.0036279 0.0601234 0 1
flex 1810 0.1878453 0.3906965 0 1
screen 1810 0.1552486 0.3622416 0 1
fl_sc 1810 0.0475138 0.212794 0 1
      
      
Legend: Obs = observations 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2000-2005 
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Table 2: Productivity effects of TAW employment (Panel 2002-2005) 
Dependent variable: lnY     
Estimation method: OLS Panel (pooled, fixed effects, random effects)  
 C1  
(pooled) 
C2  
(FE) 
C3  
(RE) 
C4  
(pooled) 
C5  
(FE) 
C6  
(RE) 
   
lnK .034 *** 
(0.000) 
.005 *** 
(0.000) 
.010 *** 
(0.000) 
.034 *** 
(0.000) 
.005 *** 
(0.000) 
.010 *** 
(0.000) 
lnL .913 *** 
(0.000) 
.405 *** 
(0.000) 
.930 *** 
(0.000) 
.906 *** 
(0.000) 
.407 *** 
(0.000) 
.929 *** 
(0.000) 
temp .012 *** 
(0.000) 
.003 * 
(0.060) 
.001 
(0.588)    
temp _2 *100 -.031 *** 
(0.000) 
-.011 ** 
(0.018) 
-.018 *** 
(0.000)    
temp2 
   
.159 *** 
(0.000) 
.002 
(0.768) 
.020 ** 
(0.014) 
temp3 
   
.109 *** 
(0.000) 
.020 
(0.247) 
-.025 
(0.128) 
temp4 
   
-.212 *** 
(0.027) 
-.194 *** 
(0.000) 
-.417 *** 
(0.000) 
qual .004 *** 
(0.000) 
.001 
(0.162) 
.002 *** 
(0.000) 
.004 *** 
(0.000) 
.001 
(0.161) 
.002 *** 
(0.000) 
orga1_std .017 *** 
(0.002) 
.004 
(0.235) 
.007 ** 
(0.013) 
.016 *** 
(0.004) 
.003 
(0.252) 
.007 ** 
(0.014) 
tech_std .066 *** 
(0.000) 
.010 ** 
(0.013) 
.025 *** 
(0.000) 
.066 *** 
(0.000) 
.010 ** 
(0.015) 
.025 *** 
(0.000) 
ikt .046 *** 
(0.000) 
-.003 
(0.579) 
.015 ** 
(0.018) 
.046 *** 
(0.000) 
-.003 
(0.616) 
.016 ** 
(0.015) 
wageset .066 *** 
(0.000) 
.021 ** 
(0.021) 
.048 *** 
(0.000) 
.066 *** 
(0.000) 
.021 ** 
(0.020) 
.048 *** 
(0.000) 
council .252 *** 
(0.000) 
.021 
(0.306) 
.251 *** 
(0.000) 
.242 *** 
(0.000) 
.021 
(0.305) 
.251 *** 
(0.000) 
noninc -.141 *** 
(0.000) 
-.044 
(0.315) 
-.196 *** 
(0.000) 
-.152 *** 
(0.000) 
-.043 
(0.327) 
-.197 *** 
(0.000) 
inc .125 *** 
(0.000) 
-.015 
(0.703) 
.045 
(0.103) 
.117 *** 
(0.000) 
-.016 
(0.701) 
.043 
(0.118) 
old .058 *** 
(0.000) 
.011 
(0.402) 
.019 * 
(0.067) 
.058 *** 
(0.000) 
.0117 
(0.410) 
.018 * 
(0.073) 
foreign .279 *** 
(0.000) 
.016 
(0.534) 
.170 *** 
(0.000) 
.270 *** 
(0.000) 
.016 
(0.532) 
.169 *** 
(0.000) 
export .004 *** 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.753) 
.002 *** 
(0.000) 
.004 *** 
(0.000) 
.001 
(0.757) 
.002 *** 
(0.000) 
15 regional 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 sector 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
yr03 .023 * 
(0.098) 
.015 *** 
(0.004) 
.024 *** 
(0.000) 
.022 
(0.107) 
.015 *** 
(0.005) 
.024 *** 
(0.000) 
yr04 .046 *** 
(0.002) 
.031 *** 
(0.000) 
.049 *** 
(0.000) 
.045 *** 
(0.002) 
.031 *** 
0.000) 
.048 *** 
(0.000) 
yr05 .058 *** 
(0.000) 
.041 *** 
(0.000) 
.064 *** 
(0.000) 
.056 *** 
(0.000) 
.041 *** 
(0.000) 
.064 *** 
(0.000) 
_cons 11.024 *** 
(0.000) 
13.553 *** 
(0.000) 
11.347 *** 
(0.000) 
11.044 *** 
(0.000) 
13.564 *** 
(0.000) 
11.350 *** 
(0.000) 
   
R2 0.8761 0.7730 0.8719 0.8764 0.7555 0.8720 
N 24799 24799 24799 24799 24799 24799 
n  11849 11849  11849 11849 
N / n  2.1 2.1  2.1 2.1 
Legend: Coefficient 
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1%-level 
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Table 3: Motivational effects of TAW employment (Panel 2002, 2004-2005) 
Dependent variable: mot   
Estimation method: Tobit MLE Panel (pooled, random effects) 
 C1  
(pooled) 
C2  
(RE) 
C3  
(pooled) 
C4  
(RE) 
  
lnK -.002 
(0.501) 
-.001 
(0.160) 
-.002 
(0.507) 
-.001 
(0.160) 
lnL .354 *** 
(0.000) 
.086 *** 
(0.000) 
.353 *** 
(0.000) 
.086 *** 
(0.000) 
temp .024 *** 
(0.008) 
.004 * 
(0.072)   
temp _2 *100 -.034 
(0.172) 
-.004 
(0.497)   
temp2 
  
.044 
(0.439) 
.021 
(0.135) 
temp3 
  
.310 *** 
(0.004) 
.057 ** 
(0.034) 
temp4 
  
.416 
(0.116) 
.112 * 
(0.099) 
qual -.005 *** 
(0.000) 
-.001 *** 
(0.000) 
-.005 *** 
(0.000) 
-.001 *** 
(0.000) 
orga1_std .046 *** 
(0.005) 
.010 *** 
(0.005) 
.045 *** 
(0.005) 
.010 *** 
(0.005) 
tech_std -.080 *** 
(0.000) 
-.014 *** 
(0.002) 
-.080 *** 
(0.000) 
-.014 *** 
(0.002) 
ikt .223 *** 
(0.000) 
.019 * 
(0.052) 
.223 *** 
(0.000) 
.019 * 
(0.052) 
wageset -.041 
(0.346) 
-.007 
(0.479) 
-.041 
(0.339) 
-.007 
(0.469) 
council -.216 *** 
(0.000) 
-.049 *** 
(0.001) 
-.215 *** 
(0.000) 
-.049 *** 
(0.001) 
noninc .044 
(0.564) 
.016 
(0.441) 
.045 
(0.560) 
.015 
(0.466) 
inc .149 ** 
(0.027) 
.047 ** 
(0.016) 
.151 ** 
(0.025) 
.047 ** 
(0.017) 
old -.115 *** 
(0.009) 
-.025 ** 
(0.028) 
-.115 *** 
(0.009) 
-.025 ** 
(0.028) 
foreign .058 
(0.452) 
.014 
(0.533) 
.062 
(0.424) 
.014 
(0.544) 
export -.003 *** 
(0.004) 
-.001 ** 
(0.019) 
-.003 *** 
(0.004) 
-.001 ** 
(0.016) 
15 regional 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 sector 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
yr04 -.196 *** 
(0.000) 
-.068 *** 
(0.000) 
-.194 *** 
(0.000) 
-.068 *** 
(0.000) 
yr05 -.248 *** 
(0.000) 
-.074 *** 
(0.000) 
-.247 *** 
(0.000) 
-.074 *** 
(0.000) 
_cons -2.325 *** 
(0.000) 
.100 ** 
(0.017) 
-2.327 *** 
(0.000) 
.101 ** 
(0.017) 
  
(Pseudo) R2 0.0516 / 0.0516 / 
Log Likelihood -13240.346 -13402.284 -13240.578 -13401.634 
N 17349 17349 17349 17349 
n  10151  10151 
N / n  1.7  1.7 
Legend: Coefficient 
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1%-
level 
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Table 4: Flexibility vs. Screening Strategy 
Dependent variables: lnY, lnY(FE)  
Estimation methods: OLS, Black-Lynch 
 C1  
(Cross section) 
C2  
(Black-Lynch) 
  
lnK .011 
(0.187) 
 
lnL 1.020 *** 
(0.000) 
 
flex -.184 *** 
(0.002) 
-.096 
(0.244) 
screen .032 
(0.611) 
.261 *** 
(0.010) 
fl_sc .167 
(0.140) 
.195 
(0.268) 
qual .004 *** 
(0.000) 
.003 ** 
(0.020) 
orga1_std .058 ** 
(0.046) 
.082 ** 
(0.025) 
orga2_std -.032 
(0.113) 
.073 ** 
(0.021) 
incentive .171 *** 
(0.001) 
.378 *** 
(0.000) 
tech_std .084 *** 
(0.001) 
.141 *** 
(0.000) 
ikt .068 
(0.345) 
.200 ** 
(0.034) 
inno_std -.014 
(0.541) 
.007 
(0.815) 
wageset .056 
(0.331) 
.269 *** 
(0.001) 
council .196 *** 
(0.009) 
.950 *** 
(0.000) 
noninc -.396 ** 
(0.019) 
-.539 ** 
(0.017) 
inc -.079 
(0.598) 
-.027 
(0.885) 
old .046 
(0.497) 
.504 *** 
(0.000) 
foreign .133 ** 
(0.045) 
.076 
(0.432) 
export .001 
(0.132) 
.007 *** 
(0.000) 
training -.093 
(0.293) 
.213 * 
(0.075) 
15 regional 
dummies 
Yes No 
8 sector 
dummies 
Yes No 
_cons 11.517 *** 
(0.000) 
-.613 ** 
(0.023) 
  
R2 0.8627 0.4602 
N 858 858 
Legend: Coefficient 
(p-value) 
*/**/*** indicates 
significance at the 
10/5/1%-level 
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Appendix 
Table 5: Description of all variables used 
  
Variable name Variable description 
mot       Motivation Problems 
lnY       Log Output 
temp      Share of temporary agency workers (TAWs) relative to total employment 
temp_2    Share of temporary agency workers, squared 
temp1     Establishment with 0% TAW 
temp2     Establishment with 1-10% TAW 
temp3     Establishment with 11-30% TAW 
temp4     Establishment with >30% TAW 
flex      Flexibility dummy 
screen    Screening dummy 
fl_sc     Interaction term (flex x screen) 
lnK       Log capital stock 
lnL       Log total employment 
qual      Share of high-skilled workers relative to regular employment 
orga1_std Insourcing/Outsourcing, standardized 
orga2_std Holistic reorganization of working environment, standardized 
incentive Pay for performance (profit sharing, stock ownership program) 
tech_std  State of technical machinery, standardized 
ikt       Investments in information and communication technology  
inno_std  Product innovations, standardized 
wageset   Collective wage agreement 
council   Work council 
noninc    Non-incorporated firm 
inc       Incorporated firm 
old       Founded before 1990 
foreign   Held by foreigners 
export    Share of export relative to total sales 
training  Offered training for employees 
reg1      Berlin 
reg2      Schleswig-Holstein 
reg3      Hamburg 
reg4      Lower Saxony 
reg5      Bremen 
reg6      North Rhine-Westphalia 
reg7      Hesse 
reg8      Rhineland-Palatinate 
reg9      Baden-Württemberg 
reg10     Bavaria 
reg11     Saarland 
reg12     Brandenburg 
reg13     Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
reg14     Saxony 
reg15     Saxony-Anhalt  
reg16     Thuringia  
sector1   Agriculture/Forestry; mining/energy/water 
sector2   Manufacturing  
sector3   Construction 
sector4   Trading und repairing 
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sector5   Transportation/communications/news 
sector6   Financial services (banks, insurance companies) 
sector7   Services for firms 
sector8   Other services 
sector9   Public sector 
yr00      Dummy for 2000 
yr01      Dummy for 2001 
yr02      Dummy for 2002 
yr03      Dummy for 2003 
yr04      Dummy for 2004 
yr05      Dummy for 2005 
  
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of all variables used 
      
Variable   Obs     Mean Std. Dev. Min      Max
   
mot 74107 0.3145992 0.6325092 0 4
lnY 78910 14.7836 2.407127 0 27.52457
temp 63284 0.7351526 3.795116 0 92.30769
temp1 63397 0.8897424 0.313213 0 1
temp2 63397 0.0888686 0.2845562 0 1
temp3 63397 0.0177611 0.132083 0 1
temp4 63397 0.0036279 0.0601234 0 1
flex 1810 0.1878453 0.3906965 0 1
screen 1810 0.1552486 0.3622416 0 1
fl_sc 1810 0.0475138 0.212794 0 1
lnK 92409 7.550145 6.023915 0 23.12543
lnL 93108 3.275965 1.926965 0 10.83671
qual 93733 64.36131 29.44357 0 100
orga1_std 93285 -8.21E-10 0.9999732 -0.2837251 12.65308
orga2_std 31561 -8.93E-09 0.9999841 -0.7938462 5.72914
incentive 47423 0.1150286 0.3190598 0 1
tech_std 93582 -9.42E-09 0.9999733 -3.582273 1.589948
ikt 50279 0.7669604 0.4227715 0 1
inno_std 31203 -2.43E-09 0.999984 -0.7619234 2.930587
wageset 93773 0.549028 0.4975931 0 1
council 100990 0.3630756 0.4808887 0 1
noninc 92724 0.3190652 0.4661169 0 1
inc 92724 0.4806954 0.4996299 0 1
old 81744 0.6321198 0.4822315 0 1
foreign 91673 0.0486948 0.2152304 0 1
export 92510 5.315079 15.79661 0 100
training 31862 0.6263888 0.4837698 0 1
sector1 141989 0.0258612 0.1587216 0 1
sector2 141989 0.1706822 0.3762324 0 1
sector3 141989 0.0606174 0.238628 0 1
sector4 141989 0.0893942 0.285313 0 1
sector5 141989 0.0246005 0.1549048 0 1
sector6 141989 0.0188184 0.1358836 0 1
sector7 141989 0.0754706 0.2641502 0 1
sector8 141989 0.133785 0.3404224 0 1
sector9 141989 0.0632021 0.2433269 0 1
reg1 141989 0.049694 0.2173127 0 1
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reg2 141989 0.027474 0.1634605 0 1
reg3 141989 0.0226849 0.1488973 0 1
reg4 141989 0.0508772 0.2197477 0 1
reg5 141989 0.0416722 0.1998398 0 1
reg6 141989 0.0788653 0.2695293 0 1
reg7 141989 0.0433977 0.2037515 0 1
reg8 141989 0.0394256 0.194606 0 1
reg9 141989 0.0580256 0.2337927 0 1
reg10 141989 0.0566734 0.2312183 0 1
reg11 141989 0.030939 0.1731531 0 1
reg12 141989 0.0512152 0.2204372 0 1
reg13 141989 0.0512082 0.2204229 0 1
reg14 141989 0.0576031 0.2329921 0 1
reg15 141989 0.0527858 0.2236063 0 1
reg16 141989 0.0559832 0.2298901 0 1
yr00 141989 0.1399545 0.346941 0 1
yr01 141989 0.1626816 0.3690762 0 1
yr02 141989 0.179366 0.3836598 0 1
yr03 141989 0.172788 0.3780653 0 1
yr04 141989 0.171309 0.3767801 0 1
yr05 141989 0.1739008 0.3790255 0 1
      
      
Legend: Obs = observations 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2000-2005 
 
 
 - 30 -
